The effect of corporate strategy and organizational design on the spillover effects of FDI

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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Least Developed Countries (LDCs), ethnocentricism, polycentricism, geocentricism

Abstract
An important debate in the economics literature focuses on the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in supporting the growth and development of the lesser developed countries (LDCs) globally. The ability of LDCs to capture the positive spillovers of FDI inflows depends in part on the organizational structures and corporate strategies of investing multinational enterprises (MNEs) relating to the establishment of operating subsidiaries in host countries. Investment promotion policies and practices in LDCs should be formulated with the objective of capturing the positive spillovers arising from the organizational characteristics of MNEs.

1. Introduction
Whether or not foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are capable of spurring economic growth and development in lesser developed countries remains the subject of considerable debate in the economic literature. On the positive side, it is argued that FDI not only serves the capital needs of LDCs, but it also produces positive developmental spillover effects, promoting productivity and competition in the economies of host countries. (Alfaro et al, 2003, Ruane and Ugur, 2005, Casey, 2011, Meyer and Sinani, 2009).

Unfortunately, the effects of FDI inflows in third world countries have been disappointing in recent decades, raising the question of whether FDI can serve effectively as an engine of economic growth and development.

It is the position of this paper that the potential for FDI-induced economic development depends in part on the organizational structure and strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in establishing subsidiaries in host countries.

Following a review of the literature covering the potential developmental benefits of FDI and the reasons for the recent disappointing developmental effects of global FDI, the paper links the effects of corporate organization and strategy on the ability of FDI to trigger economic progress in the third world host countries. Finally, the paper recommends policy approaches that developing countries should use in promoting the type of FDI that is best designed to serve their macroeconomic self-interests.

2. Literature Review
As a result of the rapid growth of global FDI during the last three decades of the 20th century, debates have arisen in the economics literature about the potential benefits of FDI as an engine of economic growth and development (United Nations, 2002, DeMello, 1999, Zhang, 2001, Casey 2014). Proponents of FDI fueled economic development argue that FDI provides more than needed capital inflows. Specifically, FDI is said to generate positive investment spillovers, which combine to promote productivity gains in host countries (Blomstrom, Kokko, and Zejan, 2000). Productivity gains are captured by host countries when indigenous firms benefit from the internal transfer of product technology, process technology and managerial know how from MNE subsidiary operations. Transfers can be either horizontal, in which host country competitors gain knowledge or insight operating at the same level of production as MNEs, or vertical in which supply chain
linkages between MNEs and indigenous firms (either upstream or downstream) provide the same benefits (Casey and Kafi, 2009, Hanson, 2001, and United Nations, 2011).

Local firms may benefit from technology transfers, improving the quality of their products and processes through observation, through direct or indirect contact with MNE subsidiaries or through former MNE employees. Relationships within the supply chain may also translate into productivity gains through the transfer of technology or managerial insight (Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrell, 2007).

Despite the logic in arguments offered in support of FDI-induced economic development, the empirical evidence from economic research is mixed with a decidedly negative component. Although positive horizontal spillovers have been uncovered in host countries in the industrial world (Haskel et al, 2007), the same is not true of FDI flowing into the third world countries. Studies suggest that spillovers (particularly the horizontal variety) are either disappointingly weak or actually negative (Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrell, 2007, Kosova, 2004, Yudaeva et al, 2003).

Several studies confirm that the growth and development enhancing impact of inward FDI is dependent on host country economic/social conditions and economic policy, which may or may not be favorable (Casey, 2011). These studies include Borensztien et al, 1998, Zhang, 2001, Benjao and Sanchez-Robles, 2003, and Balasubramanyam et al, 1999. Other studies simply failed to find significant linkages between inward FDI and economic growth and development. They include Lyroudi et al, 2004, Choe, 2003, Carkovic and Levine, 2002, De Mello, 1999 and Aiken and Harrison, 1999.

The impact of FDI on development has been most disappointing for the poorest of the LDCs. A disproportionate share of FDI flowing to the developing world goes to the largest and richest members of that group (e.g. China, India, Brazil, Mexico, etc.). These are countries either on the threshold of industrialization or those in the process of passing through the door (Casey, 2014).

Unfortunately, relatively little FDI in the area of manufacturing flows to the least developed countries, and evidence indicates that the relatively small amount of inward FDI that does reach these least developed countries generally fails to produce significant positive spillover effects (UNCTAD, 2006, World Bank Group, 2008, Collier, 2007, Casey, 2014).

The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has identified those countries that rank among the poorest globally. Currently, the countries labeled as “least” developed include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia (United Nations, 2016).

Although a few of these “least” developed countries are Asian or Oceanian-based, a significant majority are located on the African continent. As reflected in Table 1 and 2, African nations have been unsuccessful in attracting their fair share of global FDI. Developing countries, broadly defined, have been successful in this regard, but these are mostly Asian countries (with a few Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico) that are on the threshold of economic development (Casey, 2014).

Table 2 indicates not only that the African Nations’ share of FDI in LDCs has remained relatively low over the past two decades, but also that the trend is negative. The occasional spurt in inward FDI in Africa (e.g. in 1970 and 1985) is attributable to heavy investments in African extractive industries, not in development promoting manufacturing industries (UNCTAD, 2006).

The difficulty that LDCs have in competing for growth inducing FDI inflows can be best understood within the context of Dunning’s OLI Paradigm (Dunning, 2001). The theory argues that
MNEs are motivated to invest overseas as producers if they are able to exploit (1) ownership advantages, (2) location advantages, and (3) internalization advantages.

Ownership advantages arise from the property rights and intangible assets that are based on the resource structure of the MNEs. Firms seek to exploit existing technological and managerial superiority and to gain new knowledge from overseas business environments. Unfortunately, LDCs benefit mostly from technology and managerial transfers which may compromise the MNEs’ ability to maintain a competitive edge in the global marketplace. Furthermore, if MNEs are focused on gaining new knowledge and experience from FDI, LDCs are in a relatively poor position to compete with other FDI venues in this regard, particularly in the industrialized world.

In reference to location advantages, the least developed countries fail to attract significant amounts of inward FDI for several reasons. One reason relates to the absence of those economic/political/social conditions in target countries that traditionally have served as “magnets” pulling FDI from global MNEs, particularly in the area of manufacturing. Conditions important to MNEs that are not found in the poorest LDCs include large, stable internal markets, adequate infrastructure, productive labor forces, and enlightened public policy and regulations, including the governmental protection of property rights.

Finally, Dunning’s internalization advantages relates to how a MNE should invest (entry mode) in order to serve a foreign market. Why not serve the market with an arm’s length arrangement (e.g. exporting, entering into a licensing arrangement with indigenous firms in the target market area)?

MNEs will incur the costs of entering the market as a producer by establishing operating subsidiaries if they can gain new assets and insight and if they can best protect whatever competitive advantage they may have through internalization.

Unfortunately, there are fewer opportunities in LDCs for MNEs to gain new knowledge or insights compared to other investment venues. This is particularly true of the potential for MNEs to benefit through host country technology transfers.

### TABLE 1


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Developed Economies</th>
<th>Developing Economies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>$9,491</td>
<td>$3,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>26,567</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>54,069</td>
<td>46,576</td>
<td>7,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>55,842</td>
<td>41,663</td>
<td>14,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>86,394</td>
<td>70,629</td>
<td>15,794</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>136,640</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>164,094</td>
<td>133,581</td>
<td>30,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>197,648</td>
<td>166,530</td>
<td>31,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>207,362</td>
<td>172,525</td>
<td>34,794</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>166,028</td>
<td>111,143</td>
<td>53,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>223,356</td>
<td>143,433</td>
<td>76,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>255,980</td>
<td>150,578</td>
<td>103,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>343,544</td>
<td>222,480</td>
<td>116,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>391,439</td>
<td>236,032</td>
<td>149,536</td>
</tr>
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</table>
TABLE 2
Regional Shares of Inward FDI to LDCs (1970 – 2014)
In percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>To Africa</th>
<th>To Asia</th>
<th>To Central &amp; South America</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>25.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>31.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>33.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>57.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>55.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UNCTADSTAT
Also, transfers of technical insight and managerial know-how are actually what LDCs need in their relationship with MNEs. This will not benefit MNEs if such transfers have the effect of compromising the competitive advantage that induced the MNE to invest in the first instance.

However, even in those cases in which LDCs succeed in attracting the type of FDI capable of providing positive spillovers, results tend to be disappointing. For example, inward FDI has the potential to close the technology gap between technologically advanced MNEs and technologically backward LDCs, but the presence of a manufacturing subsidiary operating with a sophisticated technology in an LDC is not guaranteed to close the gap by technology transfer (Meyer and Sinani, 2009, Haddam and Harrison, 1993, Kokko, 1999).

It cannot be assumed that the operating technology of MNE subsidiaries can be easily observed and transferred, particularly if the MNE has the incentive to block the transfer in order to protect its competitive advantage. It is argued that successful transfers depend on “awareness, motivation, and capabilities.” Indigenous companies in LDCs in contact with the subsidiaries of MNCs either through competition or through supply chain relationships must be aware of the specifics of the technology and must be motivated and capable of assimilating it (Smith et al, 1991). This is asking a great deal from indigenous companies in technologically backward and technologically challenged LDCs.

3. FDI and Organizational Structure

One additional reason for the disappointing effects of growth induced inward FDI in developing countries is based on the organizational structure and corporate strategies of investing MNEs. Using the organization frameworks suggested by Perlmutter (1969), MNEs have three choices in establishing an organizational design for operating subsidiaries overseas: 1) an ethnocentric (home country oriented) structure, 2) a polycentric (host country oriented) structure and, 3) a geocentric (world oriented) structure (Moon, 2016).

An ethnocentric design identifies corporate headquarters in the investing country as the locus of decision making authority, applies home standards in matters of performance evaluation and control, and emphasizes the recruitment and development of home country personnel for key positions in overseas subsidiaries.

By way of contrast, a polycentric design designates the subsidiary in the host country as the locus of decision making authority, establishes a system of performance evaluation and control that is determined locally in the host country, and recruits and develops locally for key positions in operating subsidiaries.

Finally, a geocentric design aims to establish a collaborative approach between MNE headquarters and subsidiaries and attempts to achieve balance between home country and host country recruiting, seeking to reward the most productive personnel regardless of their countries of origin. (Perlmutter, 1968).

4. A Conflict Of Interest

As indicative above, MNEs are motivated to invest overseas in order to exploit a competitive advantage, typically in the form of a superior product technology, a superior process (production) technology or more efficient managerial talent or approaches. Continued success in overseas operations depends on the success of subsidiaries in maintaining technological and managerial superiority.

Accordingly, competitive advantages can be best maintained by the exertion of maximum home country control (the ethnocentric structure) and the use of home country personnel recruiting as the most effective way to maintain technological managerial superiority in competition with local firms in host countries.

However, host countries have the incentive to encourage those managerial approaches and practices that are best designed to capture the positive externalities of inward FDI. As indicated above, the keys to the use of inward FDI flows in promoting economic growth and development are
the transfers and diffusion of technology and managerial knowledge, emanating from the operations of MNE subsidiaries.

The conflict of interest arises because host countries are best served if MNEs adopt more of a polycentric organizational design in which decision-making authority, evaluation, and control are more locally based and in which corporate managerial recruitment and development are more local as well. Local managers have more of an incentive to assimilate and adopt new technologies and less of an incentive to block technology transfers in an effort to maintain the technological superiority of the MNE. Thus, in summary, whereas the ethnocentric organizational structure is best designed to protect the long-term competitive position of the MNE, the polycentric structure favors the self-interest of the host country, providing the best opportunities for indigenous firms in host countries to capture positive FDI externalities.

5. Conclusions And Recommendations

The conflict of interest, cited above, can be best resolved if the MNE adopts more of a geocentric organization design, seeking more of a collaborative approach between MNE and host country interests. This would include the recruitment of the best personnel to manage the firms’ subsidiary operations whether from the home country or from the indigenous managerial pool.

In establishing truly international companies, subsidiary managers would be rewarded for achieving both local and global objectives. Technology transfers in the host country would be encouraged and rewarded, assuming that the MNEs’ competitive advantage globally is not compromised.

With this in mind, LDCs should use incentive programs in recruiting those MNEs most likely to institute organizational structures and arrangements best suited to the transfer of technology and managerial know-how.

As indicated above, local workers and managers trained in the subsidiaries of MNEs are in the best position to learn new technologies and managerial/entrepreneurial skills and to transfer the same to local firms or to entrepreneurial startups (Moon, 2016). As local firms develop new competencies, demand will be stimulated, costs will be better controlled, and healthy competition will be stimulated.

The use of investment incentives by host countries today is commonplace. However, if the least developed countries are to succeed in attracting their fair share of global FDI, a proactive, aggressive, and targeted investment promotion strategy is needed (Casey, 2014, Sanjaya, 2002).

Specifically, LDCs should aggressively target those MNEs willing to adopt more of a geocentric organizational design in establishing subsidiary operations and also willing to assist in the transfer of technology and managerial skills. This willingness assumes, of course, that such transfers do not weaken the global competitive portion of the MNEs.

It would, of course, be naïve to assume that MNEs would be willing to transfer the most up-to-date technologies. However, given the wide technology gap between globally competitive corporations and the least developed countries in the world, technologies that may be obsolete in the industrialized world may be useful in the third world. A targeted promotion strategy adopted by LDCs should be designed to identify those MNEs that would be willing to assist in the transfer of those technologies that no longer serve at the core of the firms’ competitive advantage.

As indicated above, it is also true that technology transfers occur vertically within the supply chain as well as horizontally among competitors. A targeted investment promotion strategy therefore should seek out those MNEs willing and able to develop supply relationships with indigenous suppliers in host countries. This would promote both the vertical transfer of technology and of managerial insight and skill.

LDCs should avoid the general use of subsidiaries and tax relief in investment promotion packages. Rather, financial and tax incentives should be reserved for those MNEs that assist in the
transfer of knowledge and know-how either horizontally or vertically, or at least do not block the same.

Finally, the marriage of interest between knowledge seeking LDCs and knowledge transferring MNEs should be an objective of foreign aid programs established by governments of industrialized countries. Foreign grants and loans may be useful, but LDCs need more than capital. Under the right circumstances, FDI can bestow much more.

6. **Suggestions for Further Research**

Certainly, additional research is needed to trace the flow of FDI to LDCs, particularly in reference to the poorest lesser developed nations. Of particular importance in this regard are the reasons why the poorest nations with the greatest need for capital infusions have received in recent decades a disproportionately small share of global FDI.

In reference to the focus of this paper, studies are needed to assess the importance of the organizational structures and corporate strategies of investing MNEs in governing the volume, pace, and direction of global FDI flows.

In addressing these issues, regional studies are needed, attempting to determine whether the particular investment venue governs the type of organizational strategy used by MNEs in establishing and managing operational subsidiaries in target areas. For example, are MNEs more comfortable using an ethnocentric organizational design in subsidiaries operating in industrial regions and more reluctant to use this home country oriented structure, giving locals more decision-making autonomy, in LDCs?

Overall, it is important for future research to address the question of whether global FDI is capable of closing the GDP gap between rich and poor countries, and whether the MNE investment strategy and organizational design are responsible for promoting or retarding the same.

**References**


