Can binding rules be used to play democracy as a strategic game?

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Abstract
This thought experiment examines the strategy of minor political party to gain support by imposing a set of binding rules upon itself. As the party could never support an action which contravened these binding rules, they result in lowering the value of the party in any coalition it may form. On the other hand, to compensate for this, party politics in other areas may be more flexible than those of traditional parties. These rules must be simple, very clear and their number must be low. Neat mechanisms, such as voting within the party at all levels, must be set to prevent possible breach of these rules by minorities within the party. A prohibition on all uncompensated budget cuts in selected areas may be an example of such a binding rule. In contrast to, for example, Green political parties these rules may be from very different areas.