The architectonic governance relation in natural persons and artificial (organisational) quasi-persons: a basis for business ethics and an obstacle to eliminative materialistic reductionism?

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Abstract
Social and organisational applications of the architectonic relation are most familiar, but the paradigm case of the relation describes a human persons’ control via mind/will of their other capacities, such as speech, sight, and movement, for the sake of their wellbeing. It is applied analogically to intra- and inter-relations of organisational entities. This teleological relation is part of the human datum and explanandum for natural/social science. An architectonic analysis of the datum presents problems for the project of reductive materialist explanation of mind/will and organisation. The reductionist must reconfigure human and organisational architectonics as working from the “bottom-up,” via brain and nervous system events, governed by physical laws alone. This implausibly entails the denial of traditional concepts of free will/choice, in favour of physicalist compatibilism. The case for dualism or “trialism” in Philosophical Anthropology, and for traditional Ethics/Business Ethics, is strengthened by applying the analysis of “architectonic” to the mind/body explanandum, drawing on organisation theory.

1. Introduction
Architectonic governance relations are one presupposition of a quasi-personal model explicating organisations and organisational ethics. In such governance relations, personal entities in structures with goals follow procedures in order to direct other such entities to co-operatively work on realising the first entity’s good ends, in some respect, and order of consideration, within an enabling system. Activity of the second directed entity or “directee”, is “for the sake of” the end of the first, here dubbed the “archon”. The archons’ end-direction determines the directed entity’s identity and/or design. Directee activity, voluntary or non-voluntary, should consensually/cooperatively or by manipulation, realise the archon’s end. The relation, though informal, is teleological, complementary, normative, asymmetric, intentional, and “top-down” in some but not all respects and orders of consideration, within the structure with a common collective purpose. The archon sets standards for, and confers ultimate identity on, actions.

In three papers in *Philosophy of Management* the author has presented the view that Philosophical Anthropology is crucial to Ethics, and explicated the thesis that organisations can be “personal” without being persons, morally responsible and ethical as “quasi-persons’ because they share six key points of similarity of moral significance with natural persons. Any good agent a) has and intends good goals, b) wisely directs capacities, operating and enabling structures; c) uses ethical methods of deliberation to d) freely choose actions, activities, and performances; verifies end results; e) monitors consequences for other players in the practice; and f) also consequences for the community/state/environment. The second of the three papers identified justice, collective casuistry, analogy of attribution (e.g. of being, good, and health), and the architectonic relation, as assumptions of the argument and gave a few examples. The third paper used the quasi-person model to criticise reframing (Bolman and Deal (1984)); stakeholder management theory (R. E. Freeman (1984)) and Integrated Social Contract Theory (Donaldson and Dunfee, (1999)).

This paper develops the architectonic relation as a presupposition and assumes with Stump (2003) and others that there are unacceptable implications for Ethics/Business Ethics of accepting both total materialistic reductionism, and some of their related versions of “compatibilism” regarding free will in Philosophy of Mind or Philosophical Anthropology.

ii It expands a little further on the place of analogy
and architectonics in action and ethical discourse to reject reductive materialism. The doctrine of analogy of attribution seems to be applicable not just to entities in the categories of Aristotle; or to states of bodies and their causes or signs. It can apply to types and tokens of acts, qualities, and to relations themselves. The paradigm-analogue distinction can arguably be extended to entities which are only quasi-substances like types and tokens of actions, qualities, and relations themselves.

As argued in papers 1 and 2 of the trilogy cited above, Aristotle uses his doctrine of analogy of attribution at Metaphysics, IV, 2, 1003a 30ff and Nichomachean Ethics I, 6, 1096a 10ff widely. His doctrine of Metaphysics 1003aff allows via analogy of attribution application of healthy to causes, effects, signs, and symptoms of health, a state of the human body. This suggests he would have thought of causes, effects, signs and symptoms of organisations as caused by and signs of natural persons, and in that sense to be “personal”. His discussion in Nichomachean Ethics 1096aff of the analogical meanings of “good” and “being” when applied to qualities, relations, activities and other categories than substance suggests the idea that architectonic relations as relations could be said to apply in different but similar senses or ways to substances as subjects, and to the relata of the relation. That Aristotle would have approved of analogical senses of the architectonic relation being said of entities in the categories of relation, quality, and action is indicated by the fact that Aristotle adds qualities to act-types, and attributes “good’ and “bad’ to types of act-circumstance clusters like “murder.” His generally faithful expositor, Aquinas, uses architectonic analogies, appealing to architecture, when talking about the powers of humans in S.T. Part One, QQ 75-89. He speaks of intellect and will as “higher” powers which “direct’ memory, imagination, perception, sensation, movement of limbs, and what we would now call the autonomic system. Intention of an end “directs” deliberation and choice like an architect (S.T. 1a-2ae, Q. 12) The higher powers direct the lower as final and efficient causes nurturing and preserving them, while depending on them materially except for the agent intellect.

As health can be said of medicine, exercise, and diets; and also of urine, complexion, and growth, the analogues will have some select features in common with or similar to the paradigm, but not all. Tablets taken as medicine for vitamin boosts or blood pressure will have causal chemical relations and similarities with parts of the vitamin or circulatory structures of the body; the exercise will affect some parts of the body and can cause physical changes in strength of muscles; and food will interact with digestion and nutrition to create energy. Yet entities referred to by these terms are not “in good health”. The word “health” refers in primary cases to the animate body, but by analogy to complexions and urine samples, as signs or symptoms of health; medicine and diet and exercise as cause of health; capacity to exercise as the expression and effect of health. The medicine, urine, etc are not in a state of health themselves, and so not literally healthy, but they are healthy.

In Nichomachean Ethics, 1096a ff, Aristotle speaks of the terms “good” having as many senses as being, and of “being” being applied primarily to substances, like humans, independent beings who are self-moving agents which bring about change, as the paradigm cases of being and good, and analogically being applies also to entities in his “categories” (to qualities, quantities, relations, acts and passions, place, time etc). “Good” is said primarily of the higher substances or powers, like God or reason, but also of things in the categories of quality, like virtues, in quantity, to that which is moderate; in relation, of the useful; in time, of the right opportunity; in place, of the right locality; and so on with action, passion etc. There is no one science of all of these goods represented in these uses. Opportunities for war and disease are studied by the different sciences of strategy and medicine. The moderate in food and exercise, are studied by medicine and gymnastics.

The paradigm and the analogue have something but not everything in common. As medicine or food is not literally healthy, but it has chemical structures akin to some micro-physical bodily parts, so “good” or “being” can be said of the substance, and good or being can be said of the entities in the categories, like types of quality or action without it being implied they are separate beings or goods. Predicates in these categories describe a sense in which instances of these predicates of substance can exist or be “good” presumably in the transferred equivocal or analogical sense to that in which the substance itself exists or is good. Thus types of qualities, quantities and actions are good in relation to the substance or subject. An act which is good in type is not itself a good substance, but a cause or effect or sign or symptom of good in the subject substance. A relation between entities can be in a different category of
being from action or location, but bear the same analogical relation back to the relevant substance as subject.

In the human substance, the name of the ultimate architectonic good is “wellbeing”, so a good type of act, quality, relation etc. is good qua cause, effect, or sign of human wellbeing. An act-type can have good inherent prima facie tendencies with respect to wellbeing and continue to be abstractly good in this sense, even if, when embedded, with all further specific types of circumstances added, in a concrete token, the whole act-instance is not. Amongst the key circumstances are the available enabling resources (with what, by what means). In the particular case, the abstract act-type may be such that its abstractly good, bad or indifferent status is outweighed, and the particular act as a whole is bad ethically. The same would apply to a type of relation such as the architectonic relation in a particular case. The existence and goodness or an architectonic relations is said analogically of the relation, which is not prime a substances. But presumably the existence or good of architectonic relations reflects the fact that they are effects or signs of the existence or goodness of human substances. Being in a category, like action, their good can be discussed at the abstract level of type and tendency or at the level of a concrete example.

In the case of being, for Aristotle the highest beings, the paradigm cases, are the “highest substances” like the unmoved mover or god or reason, but we need not follow him there to take the “analogy of being” point. Some things are clearly substances, like humans, and others are their acts, relations, places, times, qualities or quantities. All can “exist” and be good in different ways, either as signs of or caused by substance, or as circumstantial qualities or relations of the acts and as attributes of substance. As in the health case, qua cause of health, healthy medicines (vitamins, blood thinners) share some physical features with physically healthy bodies, without being healthy in the prime sense of being themselves “in good health”, so in a similar way, because natural persons cause and have capacity to produce artificial persons-organisations and states, qua caused by natural persons, organisations and relations can be ascribed selected “personal” and have ethical traits without being treated as themselves persons. Organisations and their creators share some personal features of relevance to ethics. Organisations and their elements are personal without being persons.

If we take the application to humans’ powers as a paradigm of the architectonic relation and to organisational architectonics relations as analogical, then we should expect to find some points of analogy with the other applications. If we take organisational relations as paradigm of architectonics, then the human power application is analogical. There is a case for both these positions. The self in the natural person is literal, and the self-“governance” analogical. The “self” in organisations “self” - governance is analogical and the governance is literal. The fact that, for Aristotle, relations of any sort are not prime independent substances, capable of bringing about change through action, favours making natural persons and individualised human powers the paradigm case of the architectonic relation. Taking inter-organisational relations abstractly as paradigm cases accords better with familiar common usage, and concrete relations between organisational subjects as relata are treated by Aristotle as in turn capable of having further qualities and relations. But this paper takes it that a natural person’s self-control in relation to their capacities is the paradigm case of an architectonic relation, and “governance” is said of such control analogically; in organisational contexts, governance is present literally but the organisational “self”-governance is the analogue of personal capacity for self-control, where self-“governance” is analogical. Organisations do not create persons but they do partly cause organisational roles for incumbents in roles. Organisations are architectonic to persons as role incumbents in respect of being the cause of their having a role-of their existence as organisational role-incumbents; and of their own entering into of supply chains. Organisations can in this way be causes in this respect of the exercise or operation of natural persons, but not their existence.

Section 1 Some Basic Neo-Aristotelian Philosophical Anthropology
A simplified Neo-Aristotelian Philosophical Anthropology would recognise:
Directives, immanent, vertically integrated capacities of the self as “archon” (director, source):
(a) (i) Self-Consciousness; attention, curiosity; orientation to knowledge of truth and good especially human good or wellbeing, and use of intellect/will in service of perceived wellbeing; understanding of concepts and propositional content; self-control and judgement. (ii) Recollection/Non-sensory memory, imagination;
Operational capacities of the self, as “directees” (entities directed or commanded):
(b) (i) Voluntary deployment of sensory memory; sense-perception capacities; (ii) Flexing and other response to sensations / feelings; (iii) Overt molar voluntary limb movement and language related tongue / hand movements. Where the directee in a relation is non-voluntary, e.g. a tool or artefact, the directee is simply used for the archon’s purposes, which are architectonic to it as an artefact, or a passive potential.

Enabling capacities: Social and Physical:
(c) (i) Voluntary logical and mathematical or ethical/practical reasoning ability; applied scientific knowledge; (ii) Conscience: capacity for ethical deliberation and choice procedure (casuistry); (iii) Mastery of enabling social practices and institutions, like languages; partly voluntary semi-autonomic bodily functions-like respiration and reproduction; (iv) Nurture of wholly autonomic non-voluntary functions e.g. circulation and digestion controlled by brain and nervous system through ingesting materials from the natural environment needed for wellbeing. These are necessary but not sufficient conditions of capacities (a) and (b).

Capacities in Action:
(d)( i) Immanent (levels (a),(b),(c) e.g. attentive intelligent thought, memory, imagination; (ii) External (transitive or transeunt) vii, overtly observable, changing the world beyond the agent in willed basic transeunt action, with results e.g. pickup a key; iii) Transitive or transeunt complex acts e.g. unlock house door. In the intra-personal case, the practical reasoning process can be intrapersonal, immanent and vertical/simultaneous, and stop at the formation of an avoidance intention, without execution

Capacities in self-monitoring:
(e) (i) Potential, de facto and sometimes willed impacts on immediate others e.g. colleagues and end users. Capacities in “horizontal” diachronic response to external stakeholders:
(f) (i) Civil impacts on state and community entities; f ii) actions’ impacts on the natural environment. viii

Though archon and directee are mutually dependent, in some respect, the “directee” does not direct the “archon” as director, at least in the same respect, or the same order of consideration, as the archon. Operators and enablers are necessary but never sufficient for successfully attaining an architectonic goal, and lower entities in the chain alone are never necessary and sufficient to explain the existence and operation of higher entities in the chain. Likewise external organisational stakeholders like fellow practitioners, end-users, and the state, are not in the same relation in the same respect and order of execution as the internal staff of the organisation or other asymmetric architectonic relation between architects and builders, although for example the needs of end-users must figure in the intention of directors and architects in the order of intention.

For Neo-Aristotelians, bodily, social, and personal needs of humans cause them to act in the way they do, prompted by some entity/activity at levels (a)-(f). Most good ethical action will involve coordinated ordering of entities at all levels by the level (a) (i) capacities of the directing agent. For example, a person is hungry, at level c iv), and wants to eat something; begins to reflects on a means, deliberates and chooses something at level (a) and (b); apprehends an apple, grasps and eats it (level (b)(i) and (f)( ii); and thus acts immanently and transeuntly/ transeuntly and overtly at level (d); and her enabling voluntary/non-voluntary physical capacities are engaged at (b0 (iii) and (c) (iv). Another example: a woman wants to be self-sufficient (level (a)), so wants a job, develops a skill, at level (b) and enabled by (c) capacities applies for a job. The architectonic structure in manifest in the presence of some directing agent entity at level (a); an operating structural entity at level (b) using a procedure of decision making and enabling entities at level (c); and an initial prompting causal factor of differing kinds arising from any of the levels; this in turn leads to an action with results and consequences for other players in the context, society, and the environment.

Section2: Some organisational examples of architectonic relations

The direction of what we have called the “directee”, or other goal-focused entity/activity), by what we called its “archon” (final and efficient cause), is to do or make something in order to further the end of
the archon. Both archon and directee are different functional entities, but complementary in cooperative function, in the same domain. They act with enabling help from other entities, such as internal stakeholders; or other parties within a system or social structure, such as external stakeholders. When present in a respect, the architectonic relation can be lateral and extended over time; or “vertical” and simultaneous. The horizontal /lateral case is found in the exemplary cases of professional-client and other social and economic practices named above, and also within political states and organisations. The vertical case of the relation is found in analogue form between intentions, choices of means to an end, and its realisation in practical reasoning; between speakers and hearers in speech acts; in links between activities of human minds and wills and other human capacities within philosophical anthropology.

In Table 1, the thesis that intra-personal inter-capacity relations are the paradigm, case of an architectonic governance relation in respect of formation and execution of an intention to act in the order of practical activity, is explicated by aligning the way the natural persons can make ethical decisions, under the six headings in rows a)-f) of column 1, with the similar way this same account of presupposed elements in the process of ethical decision making can occur in column 3 organisations, and in column (4), organisations of organisations. The Table attempts to suggest that one can extend the person-organisation analogy to include architectonic relations between organisations, such as supply chains, and to the relation of such organisations of organisation to the state, as the organiser of organisations with widest scope and power. The state at column (5) is architectonic in some respects to all other organisations and persons as citizens. The criteria in column 6) rows a)-f) are the essential marks of the architectonic relation, which is present across 1-6.

The architectonic governance relation is most commonly exemplified in column 4 a)-f) in Table 1, viz. organisation to organisation or practice to practice relations like supply chains. Yet this relation is derivative, in the sense that it is caused by natural persons as role incumbents, in organisations, which are only quasi-persons, sometimes agreeing to inter-relate further. This is done through agreement by the natural persons incumbent in director roles within organisations at columns 2 and 3. If the thesis about analogy is correct, that relation in 4 bears the same distinctive cooperative marks or similarities to natural person activity, as in column 1, and organisational activity in case 2, and re-appears in 4. The differentia in 4 is that the terms of the architectonic relation in this case are organisations/practices as such, and the relation in the most familiar architectonic cases are standing relations between organisations in practices, not ad hoc ones. The essential meaning of “architectonic relation” is given by looking at the similarity between columns 1 a)-f) and 6 a)-f) in Table 1. It is like the pattern or template for trans-organisational uses of the architectonic relation, appearing like a fractal or DNA in all settings, with organisations taken as the most familiar example, but with the personal paradigm as fundamental. A leader group of a supply chain, such as might appear under column 4) in Table 1, can take advantage of the standing architectonic relation of 1 about means and use a reasoning procedure like casuistry to make a choice e.g. to sign a document.

At level d), they self-command some act, engaging capacities at three levels-cognitive, sensational/motor, and autonomic level. Cottingham (1997) speaks of “trialism” as opposed to dualism for this reason. The act has some result, together or alone, for some end-user, possibly themselves. At level e), they take account of consequences for others, perhaps members of the firm or competitors. At level f), they may have to check the legality of their act or other consequence for the community or the state, and the natural environment.

Note that the causality is mainly “top-down” exercise of pre-existing potentials. Speaker meaning, and action at c) and d), cannot be explained “bottom up” from sounds, phonetics, syntax, semantics, or pragmatics alone, and cannot be explained from the bottom up because the relation is intentional, asymmetrical, and in some respect picked out by the propositional content, in the goal, within some order of consideration e.g. the imperative direction of fit. Physics laws have no place or terms for any of this. Alone they do not identify what is being done. They will not do so even if supplemented with bridging laws connecting data from human neuro-physiology and bio-chemistry. We will need specification in physical terms of the teleological intentional act-its properties as determined by linguistics, sociology, psychology; and by reference to the speaker’s intention. A physical signature on a contract is more than marks on a paper and raising an arm can relieve an itch or execute someone.
Whether the prima facie “normative reason” for respecting the archon’s directing or authority is ultimately morally decisive is not implied by the analysis. That is a matter for Ethics, starting with whether the goal of the activity directed is satisfying a real human need or a permissible want with respect to its tendency to advance a person to human wellbeing; and whether the means are moral in the circumstances. The role of “archon” or first term in a case where “A is architectonic to B” can be exercised by the particular incumbent A immorally, so being archon is not morally decisive. But the archon has prima facie warrant for direction or collective authority via the architectonic status, and so has prima facie normative status. The archon is end-directing, within a structure of types of activity, and it is taken to be the ultimate finality or goal for direction in the operation of another type of entity, in some designated respect, and context of consideration.

4. Conclusion

Organisational theory and the quasi-person model of corporate agency has helped to uncover the architectonic relation writ large. The six criteria for the relation apply to human beings substantively, literally or analogically. Architectonic personal and organisational human capacities and activities are intentional, goal directed, and inexplicable in terms of pure physics. The natural science reductivist project, widely accepted in the Philosophy of Mind, (e.g. Dennett (1991)) appears to be mistaken in principle, as well as in detail in that it seems to wish to discard all this description of the human explanandum in terms of architectonically organised teleological intentional capacity exercise as dispensable talk. This paper has rejected this, and added another argument (F) below to the following stock arguments against reduction:

(A) Human “selves,” their mental capacities and states are indivisible into physical parts, and do not have material primary properties of size, shape, location etc.; brain and nerve cells with which they are identified or associated turn over in less than a decade, but a person’s mental states like memories can endure for many decades.

(B) Humans having experiences of sense data or qualia or secondary qualities like colour, while physical objects do not, having primary qualities only;

(C) Consciousness and mental states of awareness have an immediate “self-presenting” or “non-inferential” character to their subjects, often associated to, or framed in terms of, immanence, privacy, incorrigibility etc. They can immediately distinguish experimenter-probe-induced mental states from those they produce autonomously (Swinburne 1997).

(D) Persons and their minds are idiosyncratic, unique, and subjective. A very similar mental content or similar body would not be enough to individuate persons, since each “self-creates” through social self-interpretation and self-commitments to or identification with other persons, and personal history. This is a theme of Scotus, some existentialists like Kierkegaard, and C. S. Pierce, and Buber’s I Thou.

(E) The freely chosen, ultimate, ends of agents determine the morality of their acts but matter has no ends or ethics. There is an alleged absence of intentionality (about-ness) in material objects (Swinburne 1997);

We now add:

(F) There is apparent free flexibility, by attention alone, of immanent architectonic capacities of thought, perception and movement in agent causation or reasoned action. If matter is completely causally determined in a closed system, there is a problem for moral responsibility and/or objective rational knowledge, and so both free choice and verification would be just events in a closed, causally determined, physical, processes. If the universe is a totally closed causal system of material objects extensionally defined, then the idea of at least partly free choice with respect to means to ends and specific ends, crucial to our folk anthropology, and ethics seems to be impossible. The problem is just as acute for reductive physicalism/materialism if the universe is radically indeterminate and events just happen without our knowledge or control. This reductio ad absurdum of physicalism is well explained by reference to the architectonic relation.
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Endnotes

i The quasi-person model of ethics in organisations (QPM) is defended is in ‘A Quasi-Personal Alternative to Some Anglo-American Models of Organisations”, Philosophy of Management, Vol 10, 3; 11,2; 12,3. Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics (NAVE) is defended as the ethical organon.

ii See Chapter 9 of Stump, Aquinas (2003). “Compatibilism” is not rejected in all senses, but when determinism extinguishes agent causality / autonomy in choosing to attend to and act on rational considerations.

iii The categories of Aristotle are discussed in Ross (1923).

iv On circumstances see Aristotle on circumstances of act types as quasi-substances, at Nicomachean Ethics, I, 6, 1109a6 15ff; II, 6, 1106b 36; III, 1, 1110b 24-33; V,2 1130a24ff; Aquinas S.T. 1a-11ae, q 7,4; 18-21 ..

v Compare these types of act: killing, (prima facie bad);killing cancer cells (good),killing cockroaches good for human, bad for cockroaches; killing invaders (justifiable); or compare driving on the footpath at speed (abstractly bad),vs driving on the footpath at speed some injured victims to emergency hospital, following an earthquake which destroyed the road. Types of act and types in circumstance both have prima facie good/bad / indifferent tendencies with respect to wellbeing, although not decisive morally without more information. See Ardagh (1999) on casuistry.
vi On immanence see Nugent (1963). Roughly speaking, immanent acts “remain within the agent”, as thinking, wanting, sensing.

vii On transitive or transeunt acts, in distinction to immanent, see Chisholm 2007. Transitive acts are overt and externally observable; they pass over into a patient and change the world causally.

viii Thomists distinguish essential /vertical and accidental/horizontally subordinated series, as being instantaneous and diachronic respectively. Writing a purchase order engages several capacities at once; filling it may occur later and require several agents over time.